![]() ![]() Specifically, I address brain in a vat cases, socially justified beliefs/affirmation,and skeptical worries about the correct procedure of judgment. donald-davidson-a-coherence-theory-of-truth-and-knowledge-1989.pdf. Finally, I sketch out potential responses to objections that epistemic secure realism might face concerning justification. As with Coherence Theory, truth in this sense is nothing to do with the way the world ‘really is’ but is just a function of whether an idea can be used as a model to make useful predictions. To help develop this position, I weave together conceptual materials from Ernest Sosa and William James having to do with judgment and conscious volition. In response, I set out epistemic secure realism as an intuitive way to avoid the paradoxes that I developed against foundationalism and coherentism while still maintaining the phenomenologically plausible notion of judgment. ![]() Both views, I argue, violate indubitable phenomenological theses and thus will have to be discarded. Against the coherentist, I make a similar rule-following argument using a new brain in a vat scenario I call ‘nonsense in a vat’, in which our existing epistemic practices turn out to seem coherent but instead are nonsensical. Against the foundationalist, I marshal a Wittgeinsteinian-style private language argument. I argue against two of these positions: common kind foundationalism and common kind coherentism. This thesis constrains the possible ways justification can be plausibly structured. ![]() I do this through a transcendental argument against a thesis whose truth would preclude epistemic secure realism: the ‘common kind justification thesis’, the view that indistinguishable epistemic states must have the same epistemic status. I argue for epistemic secure realism, the view that a successful conscious act to form the knowledge that p, where p is a worldly proposition, involves coming into secure cognitive contact with the fact that p by exercising our capacity for rational (worldly) thought. ![]()
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